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Abstract
Decoy states have recently been proposed as a useful method for substantially improving
the performance of quantum key distribution. Here, we present a general theory of the decoy
state protocol based on only two decoy states and one signal state. We perform optimization
on the choice of intensities of the two decoy states and the signal state. Our result shows
that a decoy state protocol with only two types of decoy states—-the vacuum and a weak
decoy state—asymptotically approaches the theoretical limit of the most general type of decoy
state protocols (with an infinite number of decoy states). We also present a one-decoy-state
protocol. Moreover, we provide estimations on the effects of statistical fluctuations and suggest
that, even for long distance (larger than 100km) QKD, our two-decoy-state protocol can be
implemented with only a few hours of experimental data. In conclusion, decoy state quantum
key distribution is highly practical.
1 Introduction
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is to allow two distant parties, Alice and Bob,
to share a common string of secret (known as the key), in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve.
Unlike conventional cryptography, QKD promises perfect security based on the fundamental laws of
physics. Proving the unconditional security of QKD is a hard problem. Fortunately, this problem
has recently been solved [2, 3]. See also [4]. Experimental QKD has been successfully demonstrated
over 100km of commercial Telecom fibers [5, 6] and commercial QKD systems are already on the
market. The most important question of QKD is its security. Real-life QKD systems are often
based on attenuated laser pulses (i.e., weak coherent states), which occasionally give out more than
one photon. This opens up the possibility of sophisticated eavesdropping attacks such as a photon
number splitting attack, where Eve stops all single-photon signals and splits multi-photon signals,
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keeping one copy herself and re-sending the rest to Bob. The security of practical QKD systems
has previously been discussed in [7].
Hwang [8] proposed the decoy state method as an important weapon to combat those sophisti-
cated attack: by preparing and testing the transmission properties of some decoy states, Alice and
Bob are in a much better position to catch an eavesdropper. Hwang specifically proposed to use
a decoy state with an average number of photon of order 1. Hwang’s idea was highly innovative.
However, his security analysis was heuristic.
In [9], we presented a rigorous security analysis of the decoy state idea. More specifically, we
combined the idea of the entanglement distillation approach in GLLP[7] with the decoy method
and achieved a formula for key generation rate
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where q depends on the implementation (1/2 for the BB84 protocol due to the fact that half of the
time Alice and Bob disagree with the bases, and if one uses the efficient BB84 protocol [10], q ≈ 1),
the subscript µ denotes the intensity of signal states, Qµ is the gain [11] of signal states, Eµ is the
overall quantum bit error rate (QBER), Q1 is the gain of single photon states, e1 is the error rate
of single photon states, f(x) is the bi-direction error correction efficiency (See, for example, [12].)
as a function of error rate, normally f(x) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit f(x) = 1, and H2(x) is binary
Shannon information function, given by,
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Four key variables are needed in Eq. (1). Qµ and Eµ can be measured directly from the experi-
ment. Therefore, in the paper [9], we showed rigorously how one can, using the decoy state idea to
estimate Q1 and e1, thus achieving the unconditional security of QKD with the key generation rate
given by Eq. (1). Moreover, using the experimental parameters from a particular QKD experiment
(GYS) [5], we showed that decoy state QKD can be secure over 140km of Telecom fibers. In sum-
mary, we showed clearly that decoy state can indeed substantially increase both the distance and
the key generation rate of QKD.
For practical implementations, we [9] also emphasized that only a few decoy states will be
sufficient. This is so because contributions from states with large photon numbers are negligible in
comparison with those from small photon numbers. In particular, we proposed a Vacuum+Weak
decoy state protocol. That is to say, there are two decoy states—a vacuum and a weak decoy
state. Moreover, the signal state is chosen to be of order 1 photon on average. The vacuum state
is particularly useful for estimating the background detection rate. Intuitively, a weak decoy state
allows us to lower bound Q1 and upper bound e1.
Subsequently, the security of our Vacuum+ Weak decoy state protocol has been analyzed by
Wang [13]. Let us denote the intensities of the signal state and the non-trivial decoy state by µ and
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µ′ respectively. Wang derived a useful upper bound for ∆:
∆ ≤
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µQµ′
µ′e−µ′Qµ
− 1) +
µe−µY0
µ′Qµ
, (2)
where ∆ is the proportion of “tagged” states in the sifted key as defined in GLLP [7]. Whereas
we [9] considered a strong version of GLLP result noted in Eq. (1), Wang proposed to use a weak
version of GLLP result:
R ≥ qQµ{−H2(Eµ) + (1−∆)[1 −H2(
Eµ
1−∆
)]}. (3)
Such a weak version of GLLP result does not require an estimation of e1. So, it has the advantage
that the estimation process is simple. However, it leads to lower values of the key generation rates
and distances. The issue of statistical fluctuations in decoy state QKD was also mentioned in [13].
Our observation [9] that only a few decoy states are sufficient for practical implementations
has been studied further and confirmed in a recent paper [14], which is roughly concurrent to the
present work.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the security of a rather general class of two-decoy-
state protocols with two weak decoy states and one signal state. Our main contributions are as
follows. First, we derive a general theory for a decoy state protocol with two weak decoy states.
Whereas Wang [13] considered only our Vacuum+Weak decoy state protocol[9] (i.e., a protocol
with two decoy states—the vacuum and a weak coherent state), our analysis here is more general.
Our decoy method applies even when both decoy states are non-vacuum. Note that, in practice, it
may be difficult to prepare a vacuum decoy state. For instance, standard VOAs (variable optical
attenuators) cannot block optical signals completely. For the special case of the Vacuum+Weak
decoy state protocol, our result generalizes the work of Wang [13].
Second, we perform an optimization of the key generation rate in Eq. (1) as a function of the
intensities of the two decoy states and the signal state. Up till now, such an optimization problem
has been a key unresolved problem in the subject. We solve this problem analytically by showing
that the key generation rate given by Eq. (1) is optimized when both decoy states are weak. In
fact, in the limit that both decoy states are infinitesimally weak, we match the best lower bound
on Y1 and upper bound of e1 in the most general decoy state theory where an infinite number of
decoy states are used. Therefore, asymptotically, there is no obvious advantage in using more than
two decoy states.
Third, for practical applications, we study the correction terms to the key generation rate when
the intensities of the two decoy states are non-zero. We see that the correction terms (to the
asymptotically zero intensity case) are reasonably small. For the case where one of the two decoy
states is a vacuum (i.e., v2 = 0), the correction term remains modest even when the intensity of the
second decoy state, ν1 is as high as 25% of that of the signal state.
Fourth, following [13], we discuss the issue of statistical fluctuations due to a finite data size
in real-life experiments. We provide a rough estimation on the effects of statistical fluctuations in
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practical implementations. Using a recent experiment [5] as an example, we estimate that, our weak
decoy state proposal with two decoy states (a vacuum and a weak decoy state of strength ν) can
achieve secure QKD over more than 100km with only a few hours of experiments. A caveat of our
investigation is that we have not considered the fluctuations in the intensities of Alice’s laser pulses
(i.e., the values of µ, ν1 and ν2). This is mainly because of a lack of reliable experimental data. In
summary, our result demonstrates that our two-decoy-state proposal is highly practical.
Fifth, we also present a one-decoy-state protocol. Such a protocol has an advantage of being
simple to implement, but gives a lower key generation rate. Indeed, we have recently demonstrated
experimentally our one-decoy-state protocol over 15km [15]. This demonstrates that one-decoy-
state is, in fact, sufficient for many practical applications. In summary, decoy state QKD is simple
and cheap to implement and it is, therefore, ready for immediate commercialization.
We remark on passing that a different approach (based on strong reference pulse) to making an-
other protocol (B92 protocol) unconditionally secure over a long distance has recently been proposed
in a theoretical paper by Koashi [16].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we model an optical fiber based QKD
set-up. In section 3, we first give a general theory for m decoy states. We then propose our practical
decoy method with two decoy states. Besides, we optimize our choice of the average photon numbers
µ of the signal state and, ν1 and ν2 of the decoy states by maximizing the key generation rate with
the experimental parameters in a specific QKD experiment (GYS) [5]. Furthermore, we also present
a simple one-decoy-state protocol. In section 4, we discuss the effects of statistical fluctuations in
the two-decoy-state method for a finite data size (i.e., the number of pulses transmitted by Alice).
Finally, in section 5, we present some concluding remarks.
2 Model
In order to describe a real-world QKD system, we need to model the source, channel and detector.
Here we consider a widely used fiber based set-up model [17].
Source: The laser source can be modeled as a weak coherent state. Assuming that the phase
of each pulse is totally randomized, the photon number of each pulse follows a Poisson distribution
with a parameter µ as its expected photon number set by Alice. Thus, the density matrix of the
state emitted by Alice is given by
ρA =
∞∑
i=0
µi
i!
e−µ |i〉〈i|, (4)
where |0〉〈0| is vacuum state and |i〉〈i| is the density matrix of i-photon state for i = 1, 2 · · · .
Channel: For optical fiber based QKD system, the losses in the quantum channel can be derived
from the loss coefficient α measured in dB/km and the length of the fiber l in km. The channel
transmittance tAB can be expressed as
tAB = 10
−
αl
10 .
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Detector: Let ηBob denote for the transmittance in Bob’s side, including the internal transmit-
tance of optical components tBob and detector efficiency ηD,
ηBob = tBobηD.
Then the overall transmission and detection efficiency between Alice and Bob η is given by
η = tABηBob. (5)
It is common to consider a threshold detector in Bob’s side. That is to say, we assume that Bob’s
detector can tell a vacuum from a non-vacuum state. However, it cannot tell the actual photon
number in the received signal, if it contains at least one photon.
It is reasonable to assume the independence between the behaviors of the i photons in i-photon
states. Therefore the transmittance of i-photon state ηi with respect to a threshold detector is given
by
ηi = 1− (1− η)
i (6)
for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
Yield: define Yi to be the yield of an i-photon state, i.e., the conditional probability of a
detection event at Bob’s side given that Alice sends out an i-photon state. Note that Y0 is the
background rate which includes the detector dark count and other background contributions such
as the stray light from timing pulses.
The yield of i-photon states Yi mainly come from two parts, background and true signal. As-
suming that the background counts are independent of the signal photon detection, then Yi is given
by
Yi = Y0 + ηi − Y0ηi
∼= Y0 + ηi.
(7)
Here we assume Y0 (typically 10
−5) and η (typically 10−3) are small.
The gain of i-photon states Qi is given by
Qi = Yi
µi
i!
e−µ. (8)
The gain Qi is the product of the probability of Alice sending out an i-photon state (follows Poisson
distribution) and the conditional probability of Alice’s i-photon state (and background) will lead
to a detection event in Bob.
Quantum Bit Error Rate: The error rate of i-photon states ei is given by
ei =
e0Y0 + edetectorηi
Yi
(9)
where edetector is the probability that a photon hit the erroneous detector. edetector characterizes the
alignment and stability of the optical system. Experimentally, even at distances as long as 122km,
edetector is more or less independent of the distance. In what follows, we will assume that edetector is
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a constant. We will assume that the background is random. Thus the error rate of the background
is e0 =
1
2
. Note that Eqs. (6), (7), (8) and (9) are satisfied for all i = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
The overall gain is given by
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µi
i!
e−µ
= Y0 + 1− e
−ηµ.
(10)
The overall QBER is given by
EµQµ =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
µi
i!
e−µ
= e0Y0 + edetector(1− e
−ηµ).
(11)
3 Practical decoy method
In this section, we will first discuss the choice of µ for the signal state to maximize the key generation
rate as given by Eq. (1). Then, we will consider a specific protocol of two weak decoy states and
show how they can be used to estimate Y1 and e1 rather accurately. After that, we will show how
to choose two decoy states to optimize the key generation rate in Eq. (1). As a whole, we have a
practical decoy state protocol with two weak decoy states.
3.1 Choose optimal µ
Here we will discuss how to choose the expected photon number of signal states µ to maximize the
key generation rate in Eq. (1).
Let us begin with a general discussion. On one hand, we need to maximize the gain of single
photon state Q1, which is the only source for the final secure key. To achieve this, heuristically, we
should maximize the probability of Alice sending out single photon signals. With a Poisson distri-
bution of the photon number, the single photon fraction in the signal source reaches its maximum
when µ = 1. On the other hand, we have to control the gain of multi photon state to ensure the
security of the system. Thus, we should keep the fraction Q1/Qµ high, which requires µ not to be
too large. Therefore, intuitively we have
µ ∈ (0, 1].
As will be noted in the next Subsection, Alice and Bob can estimate e1 and Y1 rather accurately
in a simple decoy state protocol (e.g., one involving only two decoy states). Therefore, for ease of
discussion, we will discuss the case where Alice and Bob can estimate e1 and Y1 perfectly. Minor
errors in Alice and Bob’s estimation of e1 and Y1 will generally lead to rather modest change to the
final key generation rate R. According to Eqs. (8) and (9), Q1 will be maximized when µ = 1 and
e1 is independent of µ, so we can expect that the optimal expected photon number of signal state
is µ = O(1).
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We consider the case where the background rate is low (Y0 ≪ η) and the transmittance is small
η ≪ 1 (typical values: Y0 = 10
−5 and η = 10−3). By substituting Eqs. (8), (9), (10) and (11) into
Eq. (1), the key generation rate is given by,
R ≈ −ηµf(edetector)H2(edetector) + ηµe
−µ[1−H2(edetector)]
This rate is optimized if we choose µ = µoptimal which fulfills,
(1− µ) exp(−µ) =
f(edetector)H2(edetector)
1−H2(edetector)
, (12)
where edetector is the probability that a photon hits the erroneous detector. Then, using the data
shown in Table 1 extracted from a recent experiment [5], we can solve this equation and obtain
that, µGY Soptimal ≈ 0.54 for f(e) = 1 and µ
GY S
optimal ≈ 0.48 for f(e) = 1.22. As noted in [9], the key
generation rate and distance are pretty stable against even a 20% change of µ.
Experiment λ [nm] α [dB/km] edetector [%] Y0 ηBob f
GYS [5] 1550 0.21 3.3 1.7× 10−6 0.045 2MHz
KTH [18] 1550 0.2 1 4× 10−4 0.143 0.1MHz
Table 1: Key parameters for QKD experiments.
3.2 General decoy method
Here we will give out the most general decoy state method with m decoy states. This extends our
earlier work in [9].
Suppose Alice and Bob choose the signal and decoy states with expected photon number
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µ, ν1, ν2, · · · , νm, they will get the gains and QBER’s for signal state and decoy states,
Qµe
µ =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µi
i!
EµQµe
µ =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
µi
i!
Qν1e
ν1 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi1
i!
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
νi1
i!
Qν2e
ν2 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi2
i!
Eν2Qν2e
ν2 =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
νi2
i!
· · ·
Qνme
νm =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νim
i!
EνmQνme
νm =
∞∑
i=0
eiYi
νim
i!
(13)
Question: given Eqs. (13), how can one find a tight lower bound of R, which is given by Eq. (1)?
This is a main optimization problem for the design of decoy state protocols.
Note that in Eq. (1), the first term and q are independent of {Yi} and {ei}.Combining with
Eq. (8), we can simplify the problem to:
How to lower bound
P = Y1[1−H2(e1)] (14)
with the constraints given by Eqs. (13)?
When m → ∞, Alice and Bob can solve all {Yi} and {ei} accurately in principle. This is the
asymptotic case given in [9].
3.3 Two decoy states
As emphasized in [9], only a few decoy states are needed for practical implementations. A simple
way to lower bound Eq. (14) is to lower bound Y1 and upper bound e1. Intuitively, only two
decoy states are needed for the estimation of Y1 and e1 and, therefore, for practical decoy state
implementation. Here, we present a rigorous analysis to show more precisely how to use two weak
decoy states to estimate the lower bound Y1 and upper bound e1.
Suppose Alice and Bob choose two decoy states with expected photon numbers ν1 and ν2 which
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satisfy
0 ≤ ν2 < ν1
ν1 + ν2 < µ,
(15)
where µ is the expected photon number of the signal state.
Lower bound of Y1: Similar to Eq. (10), the gains of these two decoy states are given by
Qν1 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi1
i!
e−ν1 (16)
Qν2 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi2
i!
e−ν2 (17)
First Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bound of background rate Y0 by ν1× (16)−ν2× (17),
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1e
ν1 = (ν1 − ν2)Y0 − ν1ν2(Y2
ν1 − ν2
2!
+ Y3
ν21 − ν
2
2
3!
+ · · · )
≤ (ν1 − ν2)Y0.
Thus, a crude lower bound of Y0 is given by
Y0 ≥ Y
L
0 = max{
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1e
ν1
ν1 − ν2
, 0}, (18)
where the equality sign will hold when ν2 = 0, that is to say, when a vacuum decoy (ν2 = 0) is
performed, Eq. (18) is tight.
Now, from Eq. (10), the contribution from multi photon states (with photon number ≥ 2) in
signal state can be expressed by,
∞∑
i=2
Yi
µi
i!
= Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ (19)
Combining Eqs. (16) and (17), under condition Eq. (15), we have
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 = Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
∞∑
i=2
Yi
i!
(νi1 − ν
i
2)
≤ Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
∞∑
i=2
Yi
µi
i!
= Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ)
≤ Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 − Y1µ),
(20)
where Y L0 was defined in Eq. 18. Here, to prove the first inequality in Eq (20), we have made use of
the inequality that ai − bi ≤ a2 − b2 whenever 0 < a+ b < 1 and i ≥ 2. The equality sign holds for
the first inequality in Eq (20) if and only if Eve raises the yield of 2-photon states and blocks all the
states with photon number greater than 2 (This was also mentioned in [8]). The second equality in
Eq (20) is due to Eq. (18).
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By solving inequality (20), the lower bound of Y1 is given by
Y1 ≥ Y
L,ν1,ν2
1 =
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν
2
1 + ν
2
2
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )]. (21)
Then the gain of single photon state is given by, according to Eq. (8),
Q1 ≥ Q
L,ν1,ν2
1 =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )], (22)
where Y L0 is given by Eq. (18).
Upper bound of e1: According to Eq. (11), the QBER of the weak decoy state is given by
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 = e0Y0 + e1ν1Y1 +
∞∑
i=2
eiYi
νi1
i!
(23)
Eν2Qν2e
ν2 = e0Y0 + e1ν2Y1 +
∞∑
i=2
eiYi
νi2
i!
(24)
An upper bound of e1 can be obtained directly from Eqs. (23)-(24),
e1 ≤ e
U,ν1,ν2
1 =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2e
ν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y
L,ν1,ν2
1
. (25)
Note that Alice and Bob should substitute the lower bound of Y1, Eq. (21) into Eq. (25) to get an
upper bound of e1.
In summary, by using two weak decoy states that satisfy Eq. (15), Alice and Bob can obtain
a lower bound for the yield Y1 with Eq. (21) (and then the gain Q1 with Eq. (22)) and an upper
bound for the QBER e1 with Eq. (25) for the single photon signals. Subsequently, they can use
Eq. (1) to work out the key generation rate as
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q
L,ν1,ν2
1 [1−H2(e
U,ν1,ν2
1 )]}. (26)
This is the main procedure of our two-decoy-state protocol.
Now, the next question is: How good are our bounds for Y1 and e1 for our two-decoy-state
protocol? In what follows, we will examine the performance of our two weak decoy state protocol
by considering first the asymptotic case where both ν1 and ν2 tend to 0. We will show that our
bounds for Y1 and e1 are tight in this asymptotic limit.
Asymptotic case: We will now take the limit ν1 → 0 and ν2 → 0. When ν2 < ν1 ≪ µ = O(1),
substituting Eqs. (10), (16) and (17) into Eq. (21), the lower bound of Y1 becomes
Y L,01 = Y
L,ν1,ν2
1 |ν1→0,ν2→0
=
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2) |ν1→0,ν2→0
=
µ
µ− ν1 − ν2
·
1
ν1 − ν2
[(Y0 + ην1)e
ν1 − (Y0 + ην2)e
ν2 ] |ν1→0,ν2→0
= Y0 + η,
(27)
10
which matches the theoretical value Y1 ∼= Y0+η from Eq. (7). Substituting Eqs. (11), (23) and (24)
into Eq. (25), the upper bound of e1 becomes
eU,01 = e
U,ν1,ν2
1 |ν1→0,ν2→0
=
e0Y0 + edetectorη
Y1
,
(28)
which matches the theoretical value from Eq. (9).
The above calculation seems to suggest that our two-decoy-state protocol is as good as the most
general protocol in the limit ν1, ν2 → 0. However, in real-life, at least one of the two quantities ν1
and ν2 must take on a non-zero value. Therefore, we need to study the effects of finite ν1 and ν2.
This will be our next subject.
Deviation from theoretical values: Here, we consider how finite values of ν1 and perhaps
ν2 will change our bounds for Y1 and e1.
The relative deviation of Y1 is given by
βY 1 =
Y L,01 − Y
L,ν1,ν2
1
Y L,01
, (29)
where Y L,01 is the theoretical value of Y1 given in Eqs. (7) and (27), and Y
L,ν1,ν2
1 is an estimation
value of Y1 by our two–decoy-state method as given in Eq. (21).
The relative deviation of e1 is given by
βe1 =
eU,ν1,ν21 − e
U,0
1
eU,01
, (30)
where eL,01 is the theoretical value of e1 given in Eqs. (9) and (28), and e
L,ν1,ν2
1 is the estimation
value of e1 by our two-decoy-state method as given in Eq. (25).
Under the approximation η ≪ 1 and taking the first order in ν1 and ν2, and substituting Eqs. (7),
(10), (16), (17), (18) and (21) into Eq. (29), the deviation of the lower bound of Y1 is given by
Y1βY 1 = Y
L,0
1 − Y
L,ν1,ν2
1
= Y0 + η −
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )]
≈ (eµ − 1− µ−
µ2
2
)(
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
−
1
µ
) · Y0 + (e
µ − 1− µ)
ν1 + ν2
µ− ν1 − ν2
· η.
(31)
Substituting Eqs. (9), (11), (23), (24), (25) and (31) into Eq. (30), the deviation of the upper bound
of e1 is given by
e1βe1 = e
U,ν,0
1 − e
U,0
1
= e1βY 1 + (ν1 + ν2)(e1 −
e0Y0
2Y1
).
(32)
Now, from Eqs. (31) and (32), we can see that decreasing ν1 + ν2 will improve the estimation
of Y1 and e1. So, the smaller ν1 + ν2 is, the higher the key generation rate R is. In Appendix
A, we will prove that decreasing ν1 + ν2 will improve the estimation of Y1 and e1 in general sense
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(i.e., without the limit η ≪ 1 and taking the first order in ν1 and ν2). Therefore, we have reached
the following important conclusion: for any fixed value of ν1, the choice ν2 = 0 will optimize the
key generation rate. In this sense, the Vacuum+Weak decoy state protocol, as first proposed in an
intuitive manner in [9], is, in fact, optimal.
The above conclusion highlights the importance of the Vacuum+Weak decoy state protocol. We
will discuss them in following subsection. Nonetheless, as remarked earlier, in practice, it might
not be easy to prepare a true vacuum state (with say VOAs). Therefore, our general theory on
non-zero decoy states, presented in this subsection, is important.
3.4 Vacuum+Weak decoy state
Here we will introduce a special case of Subsection 3.3 with two decoy states: vacuum and weak
decoy state. This special case was first proposed in [9] and analyzed in [13]. In the end of Subsec-
tion 3.3, we have pointed out that this case is optimal for two-decoy-state method.
Vacuum decoy state: Alice shuts off her photon source to perform vacuum decoy state.
Through this decoy state, Alice and Bob can estimate the background rate,
Qvacuum = Y0
Evacuum = e0 =
1
2
.
(33)
The dark counts occur randomly, thus the error rate of dark count is e0 =
1
2
.
Weak decoy state: Alice and Bob choose a relatively weak decoy state with expected photon
number ν < µ.
Here is the key difference between this special case and our general case of two-decoy-state
protocol. Now, from vacuum decoy state, Eq. (33), Alice and Bob can estimate Y0 accurately. So,
the second inequality of Eq. (20) will be tight. Similar to Eq. (21), the lower bound of Y1 is given
by
Y1 ≥ Y
L,ν,0
1 = Y
L,ν,ν2
1 |ν2→0=
µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
Y0). (34)
So the gain of single photon state is given by, Eq. (8),
Q1 ≥ Q
L,ν,0
1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
Y0). (35)
We remark that Eq. (34) can be used to provide a simple derivation of the fraction of “tagged
photons” ∆ found in Wang’s paper [13],
∆ =
Qν − Y0e
−ν − Y1νe
−ν
Qν
≤
Qν − Y0e
−ν − Y L,ν,01 νe
−ν
Qν
=
Qν − Y0e
−ν − µe
−ν
µ−ν
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν2
µ2
− µ
2
−ν2
µ2
Y0)
Qν
=
ν
µ− ν
(
νe−νQµ
µe−µQν
− 1) +
νe−νY0
µQν
.
(36)
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Indeed, if we replace ν by µ and µ by µ′, Eq. (36) will be exactly the same as Eq. (2).
According to Eq. (25), the upper bound of e1 is given by
e1 ≤ e
U,ν,0
1 =
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L,ν,01 ν
. (37)
Deviation from theoretical values: Considering the approximation η ≪ 1 and taking the
first order in ν, similar to Eqs. (31) and (32), the theoretical deviations of Vacuum+Weak decoy
method are given by,
Y1βY 1 = Y
L,0
1 − Y
L,ν,0
1
= Y0 + η −
µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
Y0)
≈
ν
µ
(eµ − 1− µ) · η +
ν
µ2
(eµ − 1− µ−
µ2
2
) · Y0
e1βe1 = e
U,ν,0
1 − e
U,0
1
≈ e1βY 1 + ν(e1 −
e0Y0
2Y1
),
from which we can see that decreasing ν will improve the estimation of Y1 and e1. So, the smaller ν
is, the higher the key generation rate R is. Later in section 4, we will take into account of statistical
fluctuations and give an estimation on the optimal value of ν which maximizes the key generation
rate.
3.5 One decoy state
Here we will discuss a decoy state protocol with only one decoy state. Such a protocol is easy to
implement in experiments, but may generally not be optimal. As noted earlier, we have successfully
performed an experimental implementation of one-decoy-state QKD in [15].
A simple proposal: A simple method to analyze one decoy state QKd is by substituting an
upper bound of Y0 into Eq. (34) and a lower bound of Y0 into Eq. (37) to lower bound Y1 and upper
bound e1.
An upper bound of Y0 can be derived from Eq. (11),
Y0 ≤
EµQµe
µ
e0
. (38)
Substituting the above upper bound into Eq. (34), we get a lower bound on Y1
Y1 ≥ Y¯
L,ν
1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
−EµQµe
µµ
2 − ν2
e0µ2
). (39)
A simple lower bound on e1 can be derived as follows:
e1 ≤ e¯
U,ν
1 =
EµQµe
µ
Y L,µ,01 µ
. (40)
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Now, by substituting Eqs. (39) and (40) into Eq. (1), one obtains a simple lower bound of the
key generation rate. The above lower bound has recently been used in our experimental decoy state
QKD paper [15]. [In our experimental decoy QKD paper [15], we simplify our notation by denoting
Y¯ L,ν1 by simply Y
L
1 and e¯
U,ν
1 by e
U
1 .]
Tighter bound: Another method is to apply the results of Vacuum+Weak decoy described in
Subsection 3.4.
Let’s assume that Alice and Bob perform Vacuum+Weak decoy method, but they prepare very
few states as the vacuum state. So they cannot estimate Y0 very well. We claim that a single decoy
protocol is the same as a Vacuum+Weak decoy protocol, except that we do not know the value of
Y0. Since Alice and Bob do not know Y0, Eve can pick Y0 as she wishes. We argue that, on physical
ground, it is advantageous for Eve to pick Y0 to be zero. This is because Eve may gather more
information on the single-photon signal than the vacuum. Therefore, the bound for the case Y0 = 0
should still apply to our one-decoy protocol. [We have explicitly checked mathematically that our
following conclusion is correct, after lower bounding Eq. (14) directly.] For this reason, Alice and
Bob can derive a bound on the key generation rate, R, by substituting the following values of Y trial1
and etrial1 into Eq. (1).
Y trial1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
)
etrial1 =
EνQνe
ν
Y trial1 ν
.
(41)
3.6 Example
Let us return to the two-decoy-state protocol. In Eqs. (27) and (28), we have showed that two-
decoy-state method is optimal in the asymptotic case where ν1, ν2 → 0, in the sense that its key
generation rate approaches the most general decoy state method of having infinite number of decoy
states. Here, we will give an example to show that, even in the case of finite ν1 and ν2, the
performance of our two-decoy-state method is only slightly worse than the perfect decoy method.
We will use the model in section 2 to calculate the deviations of the estimated values of Y1 and e1
from our two-decoy-state method from the correct values. We use the data of GYS [5] with key
parameters listed in Table 1.
For simplicity, we will use a special two-decoy-state method: Vacuum+Weak. According to
Eq. (12), the optimal expected photon number is µ = 0.48. We change the expected photon
number of weak decoy ν to see how the estimates, described by Eqs. (34) and (37), deviate from
the asymptotic values, Eqs. (7) and (9). The deviations are calculated by Eqs. (29) and (30). The
results are shown in Figure 1. From Figure 1, we can see that the estimate for Y1 is very good.
Even at ν/µ = 25%, the deviation is only 3.5%. The estimate for e1 is slightly worse. The deviation
will go to 16.8% when ν/µ = 25%. The deviations do not change much with fiber length. Later
in Section 4, we will discuss how to choose optimal ν when statistical fluctuations due to a finite
14
experimental time are taken into account.
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Figure 1: (Color Online) The solid lines show the relative deviations of Y L,ν1,ν21 and e
U,ν1,ν2
1 from the
asymptotic values (i.e., the case ν1, ν2 → 0) as functions of ν/µ (where ν = ν1) with the fiber length
40km and the dashed lines show the case of 140km. The bounds Y L,ν1,ν21 and e
U,ν1,ν2
1 are given by
Eqs. (34) and (37), and the true values are given by Eqs. (7) and (9). We consider Vacuum+Weak
protocol here (ν1 = ν and ν2 = 0). The expected photon number is µ = 0.48 as calculated from
Eq. (12). The parameters used are from GYS [5] as listed in Table 1.
Let RL denote for the lower bound of key generation rate, according to (1),
RL = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q
L,ν,0
1 [1−H2(e
U,ν,0
1 )]}, (42)
where q = 1
2
with standard BB84. The parameters can be calculated from Eqs. (10), (11), (35) and
(37) and use f(e) = 1.22, which is the upper bound of f(e) in secure distance for this experiment
[12]. Eq. (5) shows the relationship between η and distance. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Now, from Figure 2, we can see that even with finite ν (say, 0.05), Vacuum+Weak protocol
performs very close to the asymptotic one.
We note that Wang [13] has also studied a decoy state protocol, first proposed by us [9], with
only two decoy states for the special case where one of them is a vacuum. In [13] the second decoy
state is used to estimate the multi photon fraction ∆ and use the formula directly from GLLP [7]
to calculate the key generation rate by Eq. (3).
In Figure 2, we compare the key generation rates of our two-decoy-state method and Wang’s
method [13] and find that our method performs better. In what follows, we compare the differences
between our method and that of Wang.
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Figure 2: (Color Online) The dashed line shows the asymptotic decoy state method (with infinite
number of decoy states) with a maximal secure distance of 142.05km, using Eq. (1). The solid
line shows our Vacuum+Weak decoy method, Eq. (42), with µ = 0.48, ν1 = 0.05 and ν2 = 0. It
uses a strong version of GLLP and its maximal distance is 140.55km. The dotted line shows the
asymptotic case of Wang’s decoy method, Eq. (43) with µ = 0.30. It uses a weak version of GLLP
and its maximal distance is about 128.55km. This shows that our Vacuum+Weak decoy protocol
performs very close to the asymptotic limit and performs better than even the asymptotic case of
Wang’s decoy method. The data are from GYS [5] as listed in Table 1.
• We consider error correction inefficiency f(e) for practical protocols. Wang did not consider
this real-life issue. For a fair comparison, we add this factor to Eq. (3)
R ≥ qQµ{−f(Eµ)H2(Eµ) + (1−∆)[1 −H2(
Eµ
1−∆
)]}. (43)
• Apparently, the value of µ was chosen in [13] in an ad hoc manner, whereas we performed
optimization in Subsection 3.1 and found that for GYS, the optimal value of µ = 0.48 for
our two-decoy-state method. Now, the best (asymptotic) estimate Wang’s method can make
is that ∆ = µ when µ′ → µ. For a fair comparison, we have performed an optimization of
Wang’s asymptotic result Eq. (43) as well (similar to Subsection 3.1) and found that the value
µ ≈ 0.30 optimizes the key generation rate in Wang’s method.
• In Eqs. (27) and (28), we show that our two-decoy-state method approaches a fundamental
limit of the decoy state (the infinite decoy state protocol) while the asymptotic result in
Wang [13] is strictly bounded away from the fundamental limit. Even with a finite v1, our
Vacuum+Weak protocol is better than Wang’s asymptotic case.
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• Why do we get a stronger result than Wang’s [13]? Wang did not estimate e1 and used
Eµ/(1−∆) as the upper bound of e1 (This corresponds to a weak version of GLLP [7]). We
estimate e1 more accurately following GLLP (a strong version of GLLP result).
4 Statistical Fluctuations
In this section, we would like to discuss the effect of finite data size in real life experiments on our
estimation process for Y1 and e1. We will also discuss how statistical fluctuations might affect our
choice of ν1 and ν2. We will provide a list of those fluctuations and discuss how we will deal with
them. We remark that Wang [13] has previously considered the issue of fluctuations of Y1.
All real-life experiments are done in a finite time. Ideally, we would like to consider a QKD
experiment that can be performed within say a few hours or so. This means that our data size is
finite. Here, we will see that this type of statistical fluctuations is a rather complex problem. We
do not have a full solution to the problem. Nonetheless, we will provide some rough estimation
based on standard error analysis which suggests that the statistical fluctuation problem of the two-
decoy-state method for a QKD experiment appears to be under control, if we run an experiment
over only a few hours.
4.1 What parameters are fluctuating?
Recall that from Eq. (1), there are four parameters that we need to take into account: the gain Qµ
and QBER Eµ of signal state and the gain Q1 and QBER e1 of single photon sate. The gain of signal
state Qµ is measured directly from experiment. We note that the fluctuations of the signal error
rate Eµ is not important because Eµ is not used at all in the estimation of Y1 and e1. (See Eqs. (21)
and (25) or Eqs. (35) and (37).) Therefore, the important issue is the statistical fluctuations of Q1
and e1 due to the finite data size of signal states and decoy states.
To show the complexity of the problem, we will now discuss the following five sources of fluctu-
ations. The first thing to notice is that, in practice, the intensity of the lasers used by Alice will be
fluctuating. In other words, even the parameters µ, ν1 and ν2 suffer from small statistical fluctua-
tions. Without hard experimental data, it is difficult to pinpoint the extent of their fluctuations.
To simplify our analysis, we will ignore their fluctuations in this paper.
The second thing to notice is that so far in our analysis we have assumed that the proportion of
photon number eigenstates in each type of state is fixed. For instance, if N signal states of intensity
µ are emitted, we assume that exactly Nµe−µ out of the N signal states are single photons. In
real-life, the number µe−µ is only a probability, the actual number of single photon signals will
fluctuate statistically. The fluctuation here is dictated by the law of large number though. So, this
problem should be solvable. For simplicity, we will neglect this source of fluctuations in this paper.
[It was subsequently pointed out to us by Gottesman and Preskill that the above two sources of
fluctuations can be combined into the fluctuations in the photon number frequency distribution of
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the underlying signal and decoy states. These fluctuations will generally average out to zero in the
limit of a large number of signals, provided that there is no systematic error in the experimental
set-up.]
The third thing to notice is, as noted by Wang [13], the yield Yi may fluctuate in the sense that
Yi for the signal state might be slightly different from Y
′
i of the decoy state. We remark that if
one uses the vacuum state as one of the decoy states, then by observing the yield of the vacuum
decoy state, conceptually, one has a very good handle on the yield of the vacuum component of
the signal state (in terms of hypergeometric functions). Note, however, that the background rate is
generally rather low (typically 10−5). So, to obtain a reasonable estimation on the background rate,
a rather large number (say 107) of vacuum decoy states will be needed. [As noted in [9], even a 20%
fluctuations in the background will have small effect on the key generation rates and distances.]
Note that, with the exception of the case n = 0 (the vacuum case), neither Yi and Y
′
i are directly
observable in an experiment. In a real experiment, one can measure only some averaged properties.
For instance, the yield Qµ of the signal state, which can be experimentally measured, has its origin
as the weighted averaged yields of the various photon number eigenstates Yi’s whereas that for
the decoy state is given by the weighted averaged of Y ′i ’s. How to relate the observed averaged
properties, e.g., Qµ, to the underlying values of Yi’s is challenging question. In summary, owing to
the fluctuations of Yi for n > 0, it is not clear to us how to derive a closed form solution to the
problem.
Fourth, we note that the error rates, ei’s, for the signal can also be different from the error rates
ei’s for the decoy state, due to underlying statistical fluctuations. Actually, the fluctuation of e1
appears to the dominant source of errors in the estimation process. (See, for example, Table 2.)
This is because the parameter e1 is rather small (say a few percent) and it appears in combination
with another small parameter Y1 in Eq. (11) for QBER.
Fifth, we noted that for security in the GLLP [7] formula (Eq. (1)), we need to correct phase
errors, rather than bit-flip errors. From Shor-Preskill’s proof [3], we know that the bit-flip error
rate and the phase error rate are supposed to be the same only in the asymptotic limit. Therefore,
for a finite data set, one has to consider statistical fluctuations. This problem is well studied [3].
Since the number of signal states is generally very big, we will ignore this fluctuation from now on.
Qualitatively, the yields of the signal and decoy states tend to decrease exponentially with
distance. Therefore, statistical fluctuations tend to become more and more important as the distance
of QKD increases. In general, as the distance of QKD increases, larger and large data sizes will
be needed for the reliable estimation of Y1 and e1 (and hence R), thus requiring a longer QKD
experiment.
In this paper, we will neglect the fluctuations due to the first two and the fifth sources listed
above. Even though we cannot find any closed form solution for the third and fourth sources of
fluctuations, it should be possible to tackle the problem by simulations. Here, we are contented
with a more elementary analysis. We will simply apply standard error analysis to perform a rough
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estimation on the effects of fluctuations due to the third and fourth sources. We remark that the
origin of the problem is strictly classical statistical fluctuations. There is nothing quantum in this
statistical analysis. While standard error analysis (using essentially normal distributions) may not
give a completely correct answer, we expect that it is correct at least in the order of magnitude.
Our estimation, which will be presented below, shows that, for long-distance (> 100km) QKD
with our two-decoy-state protocol, the statistical fluctuations effect (from the third and fourth
sources only) appears to be manageable. This is so provided that a QKD experiment is run for
a reasonable period of time of only a few hours. Our analysis supports the viewpoint that our
two-decoy-state protocol is practical for real-life implementations.
We remark on passing that the actual classical memory space requirement for Alice and Bob is
rather modest (< 1GBytes) because at long distance, only a small fraction of the signals will give
rise to detection events.
We emphasize that we have not fully solved the statistical fluctuation problem for decoy state
QKD. This problem turns out to be quite complex. We remark that this statistical fluctuation
problem will affect all earlier results including [8, 9, 13]. In future investigations, it will be interesting
to study the issues of classical statistical fluctuations in more detail.
4.2 Standard Error Analysis
In what follows, we present a general procedure for studying the statistical fluctuations (due to the
third and fourth sources noted above) by using standard error analysis.
Denote the number of pulses (sent by Alice) for signal as NS, and for two decoy states as N1
and N2. Then, the total number of pulses sent by Alice is given by
N = NS +N1 +N2. (44)
Then the parameter q in Eq. (1) is given by
q =
NS
2N
. (45)
Here we assume Alice and Bob perform standard BB84. So, there is a factor of 1
2
.
In practice, since N is finite, the statistical fluctuations of Q1 and e1 cannot be neglected. All
these additional deviations will be related to data sizes NS, N1 and N2 and can, in principle, be
obtained from statistic analysis. A natural question to ask is the following. Given total data size
N = const, how to distribute it to NS, N1 and N2 to maximize the key generation rate R? This
question also relates to another one: how to choose optimal weak decoy ν1 and ν2 to minimize the
effects of statistical fluctuations?
In principle, our optimization procedure should go as follows. First, (this is the hard part) one
needs to derive a lower bound of Q1 and an upper bound of e1 (as functions of data size NS, N1,
N2, ν1 and ν2), taking into full account of statistical fluctuations. Second, one substitutes those
bounds to Eq. (1) to calculate the lower bound of the key generation rate, denoted by RL. Thus,
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RL is a function of NS, N1, N2, ν1 and ν2, and will be maximized when the optimal distribution
satisfies
∂RL
∂NS
=
∂RL
∂N1
=
∂RL
∂N2
= 0, (46)
given N = NS +N1 +N2 = const.
4.3 Choice of ν1 and ν2
Now, from the theoretical deviations of Y1 and e1, Eqs. (29) and (30), reducing ν may decrease
the theoretical deviations. We need to take statistical fluctuations into account. Given a fixed
N1 +N2, reducing ν1 and ν2 will decrease the number of detection events of decoy states, which in
turns causes a larger statistical fluctuation. Thus, there exists an optimal choice of ν1 and ν2 which
maximizes the lower bound of the key generation rate RL,
∂RL
∂ν1
=
∂RL
∂ν2
= 0,
which can be simplified to
∂
∂ν1
{Yˆ L,ν1,ν21 [1−H2(eˆ
U,ν1,ν2
1 )]} = 0
∂
∂ν2
{Yˆ L,ν1,ν21 [1−H2(eˆ
U,ν1,ν2
1 )]} = 0,
(47)
where Yˆ L,ν1,ν21 and eˆ
U,ν1,ν2
1 are lower bound to Y1 and upper bound to e1 when statistical fluctuations
are considered.
Given total data size in Eq. (44), in principle, one can solve Eqs. (46) and (47) to get NS, N1,
N2 ν1 and ν2.
4.4 Simulation:
In real life, solving Eqs. (46) and (47) is a complicated problem. In what follows, we will be
contented with a rough estimation procedure using standard error analysis commonly used by
experimentalists.
Some assumptions: In the following, we will discuss Vacuum+Weak decoy method only.
1. The signal state is used much more often than the two decoy states. Given the large number
of signal states, it is reasonable to ignore the statistical fluctuations in signal states.
2. We assume that the decoy state used in the actual experiment is conceptually only a part of
an infinite population of decoy states. There are underlying values for Qν and Eν as defined
by the population of decoy states. In each realization, the decoy state allows us to obtain
some estimates for these underlying Qν and Eν . Alice and Bob can use the fluctuations of
Qν , Eν to calculate the fluctuation of the estimates of Y1 and e1.
3. We neglect the change of f(Eµ) due to small change in Eµ.
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4. When the number of events (e.g. the total detection event of the vacuum decoy state) is large
(say > 50), we assume that the statistical characteristic of a parameter can be described by
a normal distribution.
We will use the experiment parameters in Table 1 and show numerical solutions of Eqs. (44),
(46) and (47). We pick the total data size to be N = 6 × 109. Now, the GYS experiment [5] has a
repetition rate of 2MHz and an up time of less than 50% [19]. Therefore, it should take only a few
hours to perform our proposed experiment. The optimal µ = 0.48 can be calculated by Eq. (12)
and we use f(e) = 1.22.
In the fiber length of 103.62km (η = 3 × 10−4), the optimal pulses distribution of data, ν and
the deviations from perfect decoy method are listed in Table 2.
l µ uα N NS N1 N2
103.62km 0.479 10 6× 109 3.98× 109 1.76× 109 2.52× 108
η ν B˜[bits] βY 0 βY 1 βe1 βR
3× 10−4 0.127 2.17× 104 48.31% 7.09% 97.61% 74.11%
Table 2: The pulse number distribution and ν are calculated from Eqs. (46) and (47). B˜ is the lower
bound of final key bits. All results are obtained by numerical analysis using MatLab. The variable
β˜Y 1 denotes the relative error in our estimation process of Y1 from its true value by using the data
from a finite experiment. This relative error originates from statistical fluctuations. This definition
contrasts with the definition of βY 1 in Eq. (29) which refers to the relative difference between the
values of Y1 for the case i) where ν1 and ν2 are finite and the case ii) where ν1 and ν2 approach zero.
Similarly, other β’s denote the relative errors in our estimates for the corresponding variables in the
subscript of β. All the statistical fluctuation is of the confidence interval of ten standard deviations
(i.e., 1− 1.5× 10−23). The data come from GYS [5], listed in Table 1.
For each fiber length we can solve Eqs. (46) and (47) to get NS, NE , N1, N2 and ν.
Figure 3 shows how the optimal ν changes with fiber length. We can see that the optimal ν is
small (∼ 0.1) through the whole distance. In fact, it starts at a value ν ≈ 0.04 at zero distance and
increases almost linearly with the distance.
Figure 4 shows Vacuum+Weak with statistical fluctuations as compared to the asymptotic
case of infinite decoy state and without statistical fluctuations. We can see that even taking into
account the statistical fluctuations, the Vacuum+Weak protocol is not far from the asymptotic
result. In particular, in the short distance region, our two-decoy-state method with statistical
fluctuations approaches the performance of the asymptotic limit of infinite decoy states and no
statistical fluctuations. This is so because the channel is not that lossy and statistical fluctuations
are easily under control. This fact highlights the feasibility of our proposal.
Wang [13] picked the total data size N = 8.4×1010. For long distance QKD, this will take more
than one day of experiment with the current GYS set-up [5]. In order to perform a fair comparison
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Figure 3: (Color Online) The solid line shows the simulation result of the Vacuum+Weak protocol
(Eqs. (34) and (37)) with statistical fluctuations. The dashed line shows the result for one-decoy-
state method (Eqs. (41)). Here, we pick the data size (total number of pulses emitted by Alice) to
be N = 6 × 109. We find the optimal ν’s for each fiber length by numerically solving Eqs. (44),
(46) and (47). The confidence interval for statistical fluctuation is ten standard deviations (i.e.,
1 − 1.5 × 10−23). The data are from GYS [5] as listed in Table 1. The expected photon number
of signal state is calculated by Eq. (12), getting µ = 0.48. The second decoy state (vacuum decoy)
becomes useful at 82km.
with Wang[13]’s result, we will now the data size N = 8.4 × 1010. Figure 5 shows RL vs. fiber
length l with N = 8.4× 1010 fixed and compares our Vacuum+Weak protocol with Wang’s result.
Comments:
• Wang [13] chooses the value of µ in an ad hoc manner. Here we note that, for Wang’s
asymptotic case, the optimal choice of µ is µ ∈ [0.25, 0.3]
• Even if we choose µ ∈ [0.25, 0.3], the maximal secure distance of Wang’s asymptotic case is
still less than our two-decoy-state method with statistical fluctuations. In other words, the
performance of our two-decoy-state method with statistical fluctuations is still better than
the the asymptotic value (i.e., without considering statistical fluctuations) given by Wang’s
method.
• Note that GYS [5] has a very low background rate (Y0 = 1.7 × 10
−6) and high edetector. The
typical values of these two key parameters are Y0 = 10
−5 and edetector = 1%. If the background
rate is higher and edetector is lower, then our results will have more advantage over Wang’s.
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Figure 4: (Color Online) The dotted line shows the performance of perfect decoy state method
(with infinite number of decoy states and no statistical fluctuations). The maximal distance is
about 142km. The solid line shows the simulation result of the Vacuum+Weak protocol (Eqs. (34)
and (37)) with statistical fluctuations. Its maximal distance is about 125km. The dashed line
shows the result for one-decoy-state method (Eqs. (41)) with maximal distance 122km. We pick a
data size (i.e., total number of pulses emitted by Alice) to be N = 6 × 109. Note that even with
statistical fluctuations and a rather modest data size, our Vacuum+Weak decoy protocol performs
rather close to asymptotic limit, particularly at short distances. The second decoy state (vacuum
decoy) becomes useful at 82km. The data are from GYS [5] as listed in Table 1. The expected
photon number of signal state is calculated by Eq. (12), getting µ = 0.48.
We illustrate this fact in Figure 6 by using the data from the KTH experiment [18].
5 Conclusion
We studied the two-decoy-state protocol where two weak decoy states of intensities ν1 and ν2 and a
signal state with intensity µ are employed. We derived a general formula for the key generation rate
R of the protocol and showed that the asymptotically limiting case where ν1 and ν2 tend to zero
gives an optimal key generation rate which is the same as having infinite number of decoy states.
This result seems to suggest that there is no fundamental conceptual advantage in using more than
two decoy states. Using the data from the GYS experiment [5], we studied the effect of finite ν1 and
ν2 on the value of the key generation rate, R. In particular, we considerd a Vacuum+Weak protocol,
proposed in [9] and analyzed in [13], where ν2 = 0 and showed that R does not change much even
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Figure 5: (Color Online) Here, we consider the data size (i.e., the number of pulses emitted by
Alice) to be N = 8.4×1010, following Wang [13]. The dashed line shows the performance of perfect
decoy state method. Its maximal distance is 142km. The solid line shows the simulation result
of the Vacuum+Weak decoy state method with statistical fluctuations. Its maximal distance is
132km. The dotted line shows the asymptotic case (i.e., an idealized version) of Wang’s method.
Its maximal distance is 128.55km. This figure shows clearly that with a data size N = 8.4×1010, our
protocol, which considers statistical fluctuations, performs better even than the idealized version
of Wang’s protocol, where statistical fluctuations are neglected. For our asymptotic case and two-
decoy with statistical fluctuation µ = 0.48, and for Wang’s asymptotic case µ = 0.3, which are
optimized.
when ν1/µ is as high as 25%. We also derived the optimal choice of expected photon number µ of the
signal state, following our earlier work [9]. Finally, we considered the issue of statistical fluctuations
due to a finite data size. We remark that statistical fluctuations have also been considered in the
recent work of Wang [13]. Here, we listed five different sources of fluctuations. While the problem
is highly complex, we provided an estimation based on standard error analysis. We believe that
such an analysis, while not rigorous, will give at least the correct order of magnitude estimation to
the problem. This is so because this is a classical estimation problem. There is nothing quantum
about it. That is to say there are no subtle quantum attacks to consider. Our estimation showed
that two-decoy-state QKD appears to be highly practical. Using data from a recent experiment
[5], we showed that, even for long-distance (i..e, over 100km) QKD, only a few hours of data are
sufficient for its implementation. The memory size requirement is also rather modest (< 1GBytes).
A caveat is that we have not considered the fluctuations of the laser intensities of Alice, i.e., the
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Figure 6: (Color Online) Here, we compare various protocols using the parameters in KTH [18],
listed in Table 1 and [17]. The dashed line shows the performance of perfect decoy state method.
It has a maximal secure distance of about 68.6km. The solid line shows the simulation result of the
Vacuum+Weak decoy state method with statistical fluctuations. The maximal distance is about
67.2km). The dotted line shows the asymptotic case (i.e., neglecting statistical fluctuations) of
Wang’s method whose maximal distance is about 55.5km. For our asymptotic case and two-decoy
with statistical fluctuation µ = 0.77, and for Wang’s asymptotic case µ = 0.43, which are optimized.
value of µ, ν1 and ν2. This is because we do not have reliable experimental data to perform such
an investigation. For short-distance QKD, the effects of statistical fluctuations are suppressed
because the transmittance and useful data rate are much higher than long-distance QKD. Finally,
we noted that statistical fluctuations will affect our choice of decoy states ν1 and ν2 and performed
an optimization for the special case where ν2 = 0.
In summary, our investigation demonstrates that a simple two decoy state protocol with Vac-
uum+Weak decoy state is highly practical and can achieve unconditional security for long-distance
(over 100km) QKD, even with only a few hours of experimental data.
As a final note, we have also studied a simple one-decoy-state protocol. Recently, we have
experimentally implemented our one-decoy-state protocol over 15km of Telecom fibers [15], thus
demonstrating the feasibility of our proposal.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we will prove that the Vacuum+Weak decoy protocol is optimal among the two-
weak-decoy protocol. We do so by proving that, for a fixed ν1 (which is larger than ν2),
• the lower bound Y L,ν1,ν21 can be no greater than Y
L,ν1,0
1 , see Eq.(55)
• the upper bound eU,ν1,ν21 can be no less than e
U,ν1,0
1 , see Eq. (57)
We will consider those bounds as given in Eqs. (21) and (25). In what follows, we assume the
conditions given by Eq. (15),
0 ≤ ν2 < ν1
ν1 + ν2 < µ.
(48)
Theorem Given µ, ν1, η, Y0 and edetector, the lower bound of Y1 given in Eq. (21),
Y L,ν1,ν21 =
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
Qµe
µ)
is a decreasing function of ν2, and the upper bound of e1 given in Eq. (25),
eU,ν1,ν21 =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2e
ν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y
L,ν1,ν2
1
is an increasing function of ν2, under conditions Eq. (48). Here Qµ, Qν1, Qν2 , Eµ, Eν1 and Eν2 are
given by Eqs. (10) and (11).
Proof of the theorem First we will prove Y L,ν1,ν21 is a decreasing function of ν2 and then prove
eU,ν1,ν21 is an increasing function of ν2.
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Define functions G(µ) and J(µ) as
G(µ) = Qµe
µ
= (Y0 + 1− e
−ηµ)eµ
J(µ) = EµQµe
µ
= [e0Y0 + edetector(1− e
−ηµ)]eµ.
Take the first derivative of G(µ) and J(µ),
G′(µ) = Qµe
µ + ηe(1−η)µ
J ′(µ) = EµQµe
µ + ηedetectore
(1−η)µ,
which are both increasing functions and G′(µ) ≥ 0, J ′(µ) ≥ 0. By mathematical induction, it is
not difficult to prove the following claim.
Claim 1: For any order derivative of G(µ) and J(µ): G(n)(µ) ≥ 0 and J (n)(µ) ≥ 0 are increasing
functions.
Some Useful Inequalities: With Claim 1 and the Taylor Series of G(µ), we have
G(µ) =
i=∞∑
i=0
G(i)(µ)
µi
i!
≥ µG′(µ)
(49)
According to Mean Value Theorem,
G(ν1)−G(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
= G′(ν3)
J(ν1)− J(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
= J ′(ν4)
(50)
where ν3, ν4 ∈ [ν2, ν1]. Because G
′(µ) and J ′(µ) are increasing functions, we can bound Eq. (50),
G′(ν2) ≤
G(ν1)−G(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
≤ G′(ν1) (51)
J ′(ν2) ≤
J(ν1)− J(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
≤ J ′(ν1). (52)
Similarly,
G′′(ν2) ≤
G′(ν1)−G
′(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
≤ G′′(ν1). (53)
Define a function
F (ν2) =
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
[Qµe
µ −
µ
ν1 − ν2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2)]
=
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
[G(µ)−
µ
ν1 − ν2
(G(ν1)−G(ν2))]
Claim 2: The function F (ν2) is an increasing function of ν2, under the conditions given in Eq. (48).
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Proof of Claim 2: To determine if the function is increasing or decreasing we will need the
derivative.
F ′(ν2) =
1
(µ− ν1 − ν2)2
[G(µ)−
µ
ν1 − ν2
(G(ν1)−G(ν2))]
−
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
µ
(ν1 − ν2)2
[G(ν1)−G(ν2)]
+
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
µ
ν1 − ν2
G′(ν2)
≥
1
(µ− ν1 − ν2)2
[G(µ)− µG′(ν1)]
−
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
µ
ν1 − ν2
G′(ν1) +
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
µ
ν1 − ν2
G′(ν2)
≥
1
(µ− ν1 − ν2)2
[µG′(µ)− µG′(ν1 + ν2)]−
µ
µ− ν1 − ν2
G′′(ν1)
≥
µ
µ− ν1 − ν2
[G′′(ν1 + ν2)−G
′′(ν1)]
≥0
(54)
Here, to prove the first inequality, we have made use of Eq. (51); to prove the second inequality, we
have made use of Eq. (49), (53) and Claim 1; to prove the third inequality, we have made use of
Eq. (53); to prove the last inequality, we have made use of Claim 1.
Proof that Y L,ν1,ν21 is a decreasing function. Re-write the lower bound of Y1, in Eq. (21),
Y L,ν1,ν21 =
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
Qµe
µ)
=
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2)−
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
Qµe
µ
=
µ
µ− ν1 − ν2
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2
ν1 − ν2
−
ν1 + ν2
µ− ν1 − ν2
Qµe
µ
µ
=
µ
µ− ν1 − ν2
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2
ν1 − ν2
− (
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
−
1
µ
)Qµe
µ
=
1
µ
Qµe
µ −
1
µ− ν1 − ν2
[Qµe
µ −
µ
ν1 − ν2
(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2)]
=
1
µ
Qµe
µ − F (ν2).
(55)
With Claim 2, we show that Y L,ν1,ν21 is a decreasing function of ν2.
Define a function
K(ν2) =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2e
ν2
ν1 − ν2
=
J(ν1)− J(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
Claim 3: function K(ν2) is an increasing function with ν2.
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Proof: to determine if the function is increasing or decreasing we will need the derivative.
K ′(ν2) =
J(ν1)− J(ν2)
(ν1 − ν2)2
−
J ′(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
≥
J ′(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
−
J ′(ν2)
ν1 − ν2
= 0,
(56)
where the first inequality is due to Eq. (52).
Proof that eU,ν1,ν21 is an increasing function. Reform the lower bound of e1, in Eq. (25),
eU,ν1,ν21 =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2e
ν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y
L,ν1,ν2
1
=
K(ν2)
Y L,ν1,ν21
(57)
With Claim 3 and decreasing function of Y L,ν1,ν21 , we show that e
U,ν1,ν2
1 is an increasing function of
ν2.
In summary, we have proved the theorem.
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